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Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tony Arcieri)
Tue Sep 17 17:22:50 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20130917115449.421ebfab@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com>
From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 14:08:03 -0700
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

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On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com>wrote:

> I'd like to note quite strongly that (with certain exceptions like
> RC4) the odds of wholesale failures in ciphers seem rather small
> compared to the odds of systems problems like bad random number
> generators, sabotaged accelerator hardware, stolen keys, etc., and a
> smart attacker goes for the points of weakness.


As a counterpoint to what I was saying earlier, here's a tool that's likely
focusing on the wrong problems:

https://keybase.io/triplesec/

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Perry E. Metzger <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:perry@piermont.com" target=3D"_blank">perry=
@piermont.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote">

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">I&#39;d like to note quite strongly that (with certain exc=
eptions like<br>


RC4) the odds of wholesale failures in ciphers seem rather small<br>
compared to the odds of systems problems like bad random number<br>
generators, sabotaged accelerator hardware, stolen keys, etc., and a<br>
smart attacker goes for the points of weakness.</blockquote><div><br></div>=
<div>As a counterpoint to what I was saying earlier, here&#39;s a tool that=
&#39;s likely focusing on the wrong problems:</div><div><br></div><div>

<a href=3D"https://keybase.io/triplesec/">https://keybase.io/triplesec/</a>=
=A0</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Tony Arcieri<br>
</div></div>

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