[148004] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] DNSSEC = completely unnecessary?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Viktor Dukhovni)
Mon Nov 4 17:36:46 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2013 20:55:59 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography@dukhovni.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <18B88BE7-7E0B-4F6C-A2F6-9AF7E9637306@kinostudios.com>
Reply-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Sun, Nov 03, 2013 at 11:33:37PM -0500, Greg wrote:
> In all my readings on it I kept walking away thinking that I
> understood its purpose, but I'd then come back at myself with the
> same question: what does it give us over HTTPS?
Nothing: provided:
- You're trying to secure HTTP over TLS.
- You assume the destination website has a certificate from a trusted public CA.
- You assume that the HTTPS client does not trust any rogue CAs.
- You assume that the CA issued the certificate based on criteria stronger
than verifying that the requestor seems to control the DNS for the domain.
- You assume that CA certificates assert a stronger claim than domain
ownership, i.e. some sort of brand validation, as in EV certificates.
- You're only trying to secure the small minority of HTTP sites with EV
certificates for brand-name domains.
- If your protocol is not HTTP, there is no DNS-based indirection from
client destination to server domain as with MX or SRV records.
- ...
When one defines all problems to be nails, the solution will always
be a hammer, and people making axes will appear to be wasting their
time.
> What say you list? To me, the DNSSEC thing seems like it might
> be mostly a waste of a bunch of people's time.
Perhaps the bunch of people "wasting" time on DNSSEC are interested
in a broader class of problems.
--
Viktor.
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