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Re: [Cryptography] Moving forward on improving HTTP's security

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (ianG)
Sun Nov 24 15:12:24 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 2013 13:38:52 +0300
From: ianG <iang@iang.org>
To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk@gmail.com>, 
	"jamesd@echeque.com" <jamesd@echeque.com>
In-Reply-To: <C9FB55B8-2072-4BAA-AA87-C990EB9E099E@gmail.com>
Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

On 23/11/13 18:14 PM, John Kelsey wrote:
> NSA is a good model for the attacker, but there are a lot of attackers th=
at aren't NSA, ranging from nosy neighbors to local cops to criminals to fo=
reign governments to big companies and their ethics-free contractors.  Movi=
ng to TLS everywhere will make eavesdropping harder across the board, and w=
ill be more effective the more we apply additional defenses against mitm at=
tacks.


I agree.  There might still be some debate about how we get there.

Going HTTPS with the current (PKI v. MITM) arrangement is not going to =

work, IMHO, because of the economics.

Look at the OODA cycle for changes in SSL, it's minimum 3.5 years [0] =

more likely a decade (SNI, MD5).  Now apply an OODA prediction across to =

the HTTP world.  It will be longer for a dramatic, non-compatible, =

costly change.

The only economic way this is going to happen is if the change is =

cost-free, plus-benefit and is viral.  Turning on opportunistic =

encryption is one way that meets those goals, give or take.  Like =

STARTTLS, if I recall correctly.

( And, for those who are upset at the NSA and their "golden age of =

SIGINT" [1] opportunistic encryption has an added bonus of stopping the =

easy flow of economic intel across to the various agencies of interest. =

  That alone is worth the price -- cryptography advances in employment =

have always been pushed by the perception of danger, not by the real =

dangers. )



iang



[0] http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001210.html

[1] Thank you John Young and Edward Snowden:
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf

"For decades, Signals Intelligence has sustained deep and persistent =

access to all manner of adversaries to inform and guide the actions and =

decisions of Presidents, military commanders, policy makers and =

clandestine service officers. As the world has changed, and global =

interdependence and the advent of the information age have transformed =

the nature of our target space, we have adapted in innovative and =

creative ways that have led some to describe the current day as =93the =

golden age of SIGINT.=94 "
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