[148348] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Kindle as crypto hardware
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tom Ritter)
Wed Dec 4 13:28:39 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAGZkp18U+9hAB1-biE8VauvM3NKEoBSUbxfxxKU9Jf+4dahpRw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 08:56:29 -0500
To: Taral <taralx@gmail.com>
Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,
Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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On 4 December 2013 00:57, Taral <taralx@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > What I really want from a crypto key management device is that it be
> >
> > * Small and light
> > * Have processor and display capabilities
> > * Be possible to control the operating system build completely
> > * Be cheap enough to be a burner machine
>
> Does it need to be resistant to physical attack?
>
Yes, I would add Tamper Evident. I don't want to carry a key management
device everywhere. It _might_ be feasible if it was one of those stub usbs
that are as small as the plug itself... but there goes the display.
The question is, can tamper evident be grafted _onto_ a kindle easily and
reliably? Nearly all forms of tamper evidence have fallen to Defcon's
Tamper Evident contest. That doesn't mean they're worthless, because they
increase attacker cost, but they can't be relied on fully.
-tom
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 4=
December 2013 00:57, Taral <span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:taralx@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">taralx@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"im">On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <=
<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> What I really want from a crypto key management device is that it be<b=
r>
><br>
> * Small and light<br>
> * Have processor and display capabilities<br>
> * Be possible to control the operating system build completely<br>
> * Be cheap enough to be a burner machine<br>
<br>
</div>Does it need to be resistant to physical attack?<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Yes, I would add Tamper Evident. =A0I don't want to car=
ry a key management device everywhere. =A0It _might_ be feasible if it was =
one of those stub usbs that are as small as the plug itself... but there go=
es the display.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The question is, can tamper evident be grafted _onto_ a=
kindle easily and reliably? =A0Nearly all forms of tamper evidence have fa=
llen to Defcon's Tamper Evident contest. =A0That doesn't mean they&=
#39;re worthless, because they increase attacker cost, but they can't b=
e relied on fully.</div>
<div><br></div><div>-tom</div></div></div></div>
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