[18405] in APO-L
Re: charity vs philanthropy (long) (fwd)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Pepsi)
Tue Mar 10 17:25:47 1998
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 1998 17:06:21 -0500
Reply-To: Pepsi <pepsi@OLIVIER.PC.CS.CMU.EDU>
From: Pepsi <pepsi@OLIVIER.PC.CS.CMU.EDU>
To: Multiple recipients of list APO-L <APO-L@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU>
Off another list. Interesting stuff. -Joy
But the little boy said...
There are so many colors in the rainbow,
so many colors in the morning sun, so many
colors in the flower, and I see every single one."
Harry Chapin, "Flowers Are Red,"
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 1998 14:07:41 -0500
From: Ernie Ginsler <the.ginslers@SYMPATICO.CA>
Reply-To: NonProfit and Voluntary Action Discussion Group
<ARNOVA-L@WVNVM.WVNET.EDU>
To: ARNOVA-L@WVNVM.WVNET.EDU
Subject: Re: charity vs philanthropy (long)
At 09:10 AM 09/03/98 -0800, you wrote:
>Forgive my ignorance, but what's the distinction between charity and
>philanthropy ? How are they differentially defined ?
>
Maybe this will help. It is taken from a recent report by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission
Ernie Ginsler
Ginsler and Associates Inc.
Planning, Allocation, and Evaluation Services
(519) 579-9040
(519) 74207846
the.ginslers@sympatico.ca
2. DEFINITION OF CHARITY
(a) The Connotations of "Charity", "Philanthropy", and "Altruism"
One approach to the problem of defining "charity" is to begin by noticing
various differences in the
meaning of two related terms, "charity" and "philanthropy".1 "Charity", in
its main connotation,
signifies acts of kindness and consideration that demonstrate concern for
the poor and needy;
"philanthropy" signifies acts of generosity that demonstrate regard for the
achievements of human
kind in general.2 The first conception emphasizes feelings of empathy for
people in emotional,
economic, or physical distress; the latter is moved by respect for the
higher endeavours of humanity,
such as the sciences, philosophy, the arts, and sports. The abstraction
uniting these two terms is that
they are both concerned with (1)good (2)others. The structure and content of
"charity" and
"philanthropy" in these senses are, at this level of abstraction, the same.
The differences lie at a
deeper level: in the identification of the beneficiaries or the clientele of
each (the disadvantaged
versus the National Ballet, for example); in the types of human well-being
pursued (economic and
social capacity versus aesthetic and intellectual capacity, for example);
and in the emotions
associated with each (concern for the poor versus respect for the
achievements of science, for
example).
There are pejorative connotations of both terms that "altruism", a general
term that comprehends
both, avoids. "Charity" is sometimes taken to connote pity or disdain for
its beneficiaries; by
"philanthropy" some people understand aesthetic conceit, or plutocratic and
aristocratic arrogance.3
Perhaps to avoid aspects of the first connotation, "caritas" in Corinthians
1:13 is invariably
translated as "love" not "charity". "Charity" also evokes a religious
connection, and in
Judeo-Christian religious traditions, among others, in its highest form it
is the love of God.
"Philanthropy" is more secular. It is commonly associated, for example, with
the benefactions of the
great robber-baron philanthropists of the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In the Aristotelian/Thomist tradition, charity is the principal
element of the virtue of
friendship; philanthropy or "liberality" is an aspect of the virtue of
temperance and, in particular,
identifies how wealthy persons should spend their money.
Despite these clear differences in both positive and pejorative
connotations, "charity" is used by the
law to express both meanings. "Altruism" is almost as useful a term in this
same context, and it will
be used for the purposes of this chapter only in the quest for a real
definition. "Charity" and
"philanthropy", in this chapter only, are used in the narrower senses.
Interestingly, the law also marks a distinction between "charity" and
"philanthropy"4 for certain
purposes. That distinction is also manifest in many of the opinions
expressed in submissions to the
Commission. Some of the submissions from organizations that do charitable
work argued that
philanthropic work is "different" and somewhat less worthy of favourable
consideration. For many
on the philanthropy side of the divide, the feeling was mutual, at least to
the extent that these
organizations accepted the fact that a substantive divide exists. Among the
submissions from
philanthropically oriented organizations, there were also differences of
opinion as to whether, for
instance, sports is as worthy as medical research. Finally, there was a body
of opinion that religion
is a case apart altogether, perhaps a third category.
Despite these differences of opinion, we take the structural and substantive
identity of the two
aspects of altruism, (1)good (2)others, as the starting point of a real
definition. The present difficulty
is to identify first meaning of "doing good", and second meaning of "others".
(b) The Meaning of "Doing Good"
To answer the first question, we must look beyond the purely material
aspects of the particular thing
or service donated, since wealth in almost any form can be used
altruistically. The important issues
are the designated purpose and/or the actual use of the donated wealth. The
first question, then, is:
What purposes or what uses are altruistic?
On the whole, the law does a tolerably good job answering this question.
Instead of offering a
definition, however, the law merely lists three general purposes, and a
fourth catch-all purpose:5
(1) the relief of poverty; (2)advancement of religion; (3)advancement of
education; and
(4)advancement of "other causes beneficial to the community."6
This is helpful as far as it goes, but a list is not a definition. We need
to know what unites the items
on the list. This question is usually avoided by judges and textbook writers
alike, even if the fourth
category has always implicitly suggested a possible answer.
The philosopher John Finnis, writing in the natural law tradition,
contributes helpfully in responding
to this question. Finnis identifies a range of human goods almost identical
in scope and meaning to
the common-law list.7
Their unifying factor in his view is that they are "basic forms of human
flourishing to be pursued and
realized" in all practical activity. The basic human goods on Finnis' more
complete list are our
ultimate purposes; they are the ones that give all our right-thinking
actions their point, making them
intelligible to ourselves and others. Finnis argues that there are a limited
number of such goods. Life
is one of them and, using life as an example, he argues that we understand
the life-saving or
life-sustaining actions of a doctor because we know without doubt that life
is to be pursued.
Nobody asks, "Why does the doctor want to save the patient's life?" That
question is unanswerable
except to say, "That life is to be pursued is self-evident: any sane person
is capable of seeing that
life as such is worth having". Finnis lists life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship,
religion, and practical reasonableness as goods per se nota. We would add
work to this list.8 In
moral theory, these basic goods form the first principles of practical
reason in making choices. What
is helpful in the theory for present purposes are the similarities with some
modification between
Finnis' categories and the common-law classification of charitable purposes,
and, more important,
Finnis' isolation of what it is that unites the things on the list, that is,
that they are self-evident and
underived human goods.
By "life", Finnis means "every aspect of vitality which puts a human being
in good shape for self-
determination".9 Hospitals, medical schools, the work of surgeons and
nurses, famine relief, soup
kitchens, road safety laws, etc., all participate in the good of life. By
"knowledge", Finnis means,
simply, the good we achieve when we get "to the truth of the matter", or the
good we identify when
we speak of "knowledge for its own sake", or what we mean when we say, "It
would be good to
find out". Thus, for example, we consider the well- informed person, to that
extent, to be well off,
and not only for the profitable use he can make of his knowledge. Truth, in
short, is self-evidently
worth pursuing. By "play", Finnis means "performances which have no point
beyond the
performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake".10 The performance may be
"solitary or social,
intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or
relatively informal, conventional or
ad hoc".11 It is sufficient to explain the behaviour of people involved in a
game to say, "They enjoy
playing". The good of "aesthetic experience" points to the self-evident
goodness, "the
to-be-pursuedness" of beauty. The good of sociability or "friendship" can
range from a minimum of
peace and harmony among persons, to acting for the sake of one's friend. By
"religion", Finnis
means the "establishing and maintenance of a proper relationship between
oneself and the divine",12
the arrangement of all orders in an ultimate order of things. Secular
humanism has brought with it
scepticism over whether religion is a basic human good. Finnis argues that
the sceptic must admit, at
the very least, that whether in fact God exists or not, the question of
God's existence is crucially
important for everyone. Finally, there is "practical reasonableness" or
reasonableness, the basic
good of being able "to bring one's own intelligence to bear effectively...on
the problems of choosing
one's actions and life-style and shaping one's own character...[T]his
involves that one has a measure
of effective freedom;...it [also] involves that one seeks to bring an
intelligent and reasonable order
into one's own action and habits and practical attitudes."13
Altruism, then, is the provision of the material, social, or emotional means
to pursue these basic
human goods these common or universal goods to others so that they may
flourish. When we help
the poor, our object is to provide them with the material advantages of
shelter and sustenance (life),
as well as the means to pursue the other goods (knowledge, play, religion).
Material or financial
support for a primary school provides the means for others to pursue not
only the good of
knowledge, but, especially among children, the good of practical
reasonableness, that is, the ability
to live a balanced, well-ordered life. Donations to hospital foundations go
exclusively to the
purposes hospitals pursue, such as care of the sick or health research, the
point of which is to
contribute to health of others.
There are as many ways to assist others in the pursuit of these goods as
there are people with the
resources to do so. In fact there are many more: the variety in specificity
of these goods is as rich as
the human imagination; they are certainly richer than the hundreds of cases
cited in the always
lengthy definition chapters of charity law texts. There is a logic about the
connection between the
goods and any particular instantiation which Finnis attempts to capture in
the concept of
"determination" or "implementation". A community, through its laws, provides
the conditions for the
coordination of the pursuit by its members of these human goods, and
therefore a law, in the natural
law tradition, is a determination or implementation of these goods.
Similarly, altruistic projects, that
is, projects formally intended to help and which actually do help others to
pursue these goods, are
also, according to the definition being advanced, determinations or
implementations of the goods. In
both cases, practical intelligence is engaged to design and implement a
project (of law or charity)
that actually instantiates or is a determination of the good.
One aspect of the divide, noted previously, between "charity" and
"philanthropy" may now be more
easily explained. The divide is based not on a ranking of these goods, but,
in part, on the degrees of
deprivation of the means of flourishing in the beneficiaries. The
economically destitute are bereft of
any means; the young dancer's chances of perfecting his art are merely
diminished by his lack of
resources. True, we can easily imagine cases in which our sympathy and,
therefore, even our
altruism is directed more strongly towards the promising dancer who lacks
means, than it is towards
the derelict who will not change his ways. Nonetheless, there are degrees of
need and degrees of
deprivation of the means to live a fulfilling life. "Charity" in the narrow
sense identifies the most
wanting end of the continuum, "philanthropy", the least. The critical
observation is that what seemed
to be a difference in kind is now seen as only a difference in degree.
Perhaps this explains the law's
wisdom in its more inclusive use of "charity".
(c) The Meaning of "Others"
The second half of our working definition of altruism required that whatever
was determined to be
good had to be done "for others". Benefits to oneself, one's family, one's
relatives, or one's friends
are more a matter of obligation (moral or legal) or affection than altruism,
even though it is often said
that charity begins at home.14 Indeed, the obligational aspect is recognized
by the income tax
system in its treatment of the family as, in part, the taxable unit.
"Altruism" connotes dispositions
towards individuals that are more remote in our affections or to whom we are
not otherwise
obligated. "Strangers" is perhaps too strong a word to express the distance
required, but it is helpful
because it does emphasize that some such distance is mandatory.
The requirement of emotional and obligational distance seems easy to accept.
Interestingly, it raises
a more difficult question regarding the general relevance of the motives of
a donor, because, in part,
it is the motives of the donor that we are focusing on in requiring an
emotional and obligational
distance. To be purely altruistic, we seem to be saying, an act has to have
as its motive, as well as
its form and actual effect, the doing of good for strangers.15 True
altruism, like true liberality or true
justice, in this view, is a disposition of the will before it is anything
else.16 Clearly, the case of
helping the economically destitute will usually fit this difficult
criterion, since any act of aid to the
destitute almost certainly has to have as its principal motive helping a
stranger.17 Just as clearly,
however, much philanthropic work is motivated by considerations other than
or in addition to
simply doing good by others, for example, self-aggrandizement, social
status, or personal
gratification.18 In this way, an inquiry into motives may help to understand
the distinction between
charity and philanthropy: these classifications identify two poles on a
second continuum, a
continuum expressing the purity of the motives of people who help strangers.
Charity is at one end,
since an act of this nature is invariably quite close to the ideal of pure
altruism; philanthropy is at the
other, since an act of this nature is probably less purely altruistic in motive.
The legal, if not the moral, practice, however, is very reticent about
engaging in any overt
consideration of a donor's true motives. For obvious reasons, the law
generally focuses only on the
donor's formal purpose and the actual effect.19 Consequently, the law does
not recognize any
general distinction between charity and philanthropy on this ground either.
Nonetheless, the
distinction is an important one which ought to be borne in mind in any
discussion of the law of
charity aimed at its reform.
The observation that charity and philanthropy can be understood as situated
on two continuums
(first, the degrees of deprivation of the means of living a fulfilling life
and, second, the purity of the
donor's motives) is evidenced in an interesting and provocative way in the
good of religion. The
secular humanist argues as follows: "Religion is mere superstition, not
really a good, and therefore its
absence can in fact cause no real or permanent (only temporary and
psychological) deprivation.
Moreover, the good if it is goodis generally consumed by the members of the
faith. Their donations,
therefore, go to themselves. In sum, there is no good, and even if there is,
it is not for others." Yet,
contrary to the sceptic's conclusions about what the law should be, the law
treats religion perhaps
as the most favoured basic human good of all. This degree of difference of
opinion makes for an
interesting debate. The sceptic's reading of religion is based on his
explicit denial of the self-evident
proposition that religion is good. A more positive view maintains that
donations for the support of
religious institutions are not, as it were, one half of an exchange
transaction in which the institution
offers psychological comfort in return for membership dues.
