[2674] in Kerberos

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Clinton Crypto System - IGNORE PREVIOUS MESSAGE

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ganesan)
Mon Apr 19 17:45:48 1993

From: bf4grjc@socrates.MIT.EDU (Ganesan)
To: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 17:22:21 -0500 (EDT)
Cc: kerberos@Athena.MIT.EDU, denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu
Reply-To: bf4grjc@bell-atl.com

 
 1) Thought this would be good time to remind the security 
    community  of the 1st ACM Conference  on Computer and Communications 
    Security, to be held in November 1993. Dorothy Denning, the General Chair, 
    MAY be organizing a panel on our favourite topic.....  Also paper 
    submissions (see enclosed CFP) are due to me by May 15. Note that 
    "Cryptographic Standards" is one of the  topics....
 
 2) Doesn't this thing have a name? Its NOT a key exchange standard. How about
    the Clinton Crypto System (CCS) since the buck for this stops with him??
 
 3) Re: Keeping algorithms secret. Fine. Use the greatest tamperproofing 
    chip technology you can find. What they CANNOT DO is keep the usage 
    a secret. i.e. the i/o parmaters, pin details HAVE to be public. As one
    of the inputs is the session key K - the question boils down to this:
 
 Introducing: The GOTCHA chip
 ----------------------------
What does it cost to manufacture a chip with an identical external 
configuration that uses some completely different encryption method, but is 
plug compatible with the PCS equipment or the motherboard of a computer? Lets 
call this the GOTCHA chip. Any two users who use the GOTCHA chip instead of the
CLIPPER chip WILL have a secure, UNTAPPABLE, channel. 

Cost of GOTCHA chip: Probably quite high. The Fixed Cost of chips are high 
compared to the unit cost. However this cost is HARDLY LIKELY to be out of 
the reach of a sophisticated drug/terrorist ring. (Also: Can the govt. make 
production/possesion/use of the GOTCHA chip illegal? Are there parallels 
here with the use of radar detectors?

Hypothetically, we can break line-tapping activities as targeted against
three classes of users:
 
Category 1: Terrorists/Drug-Dealers: The big guys, whom the govt. is most 
interested in tapping. These guys will probably use the GOTCHA chip.

Category 2: Lesser criminals who will probably use the CLIPPER chip for 
convenience. I mean "lessor' in terms of the societal impact of the 
crime - NOT its nature. Maybe kidnappers, serial killers and rapists 
belong here.

Category 3: Misuse/abuse against innocent people. These users WILL use the 
CLIPPER chip. 

If you are willing to buy the argument that Category 1, WILL use the 
GOTCHA chip, then someone needs to ratiocinate the benefits of catching 
the Category 2 criminals against the abuse.
 
Ravi
-- 
 
 
*******************************************************************************
 
 Ravi Ganesan                            e-mail: ravi@socrates.bell-atl.com
 IS SAS Corporate Network Planning       v-mail: (301) 595-8439
 Bell Atlantic                           Fax:    (301) 595-1341
 
 Note: If your e-mail reply to me bounces, try sending it explicitly to 
 ravi@socrates.bell-atl.com instead of using the 'reply' feature.
******************************************************************************


********* 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security **********
			Nov 3-5 1993, Fairfax, Virginia


			     Sponsor: ACM SIGSAC	
		Hosts: 	Bell Atlantic and George Mason U

		     In cooperation and participation from:
		International Association of Cryptologic Research
	IEEE Communications Society TC on Network Operations and Management
		 IEEE Computer Society TC on Security and Privacy


			 C A L L   F O R   P A P E R S
			-------------------------------

Topics of interest
==================

The purpose of this new conference is to bring together researchers and 
practitioners of computer and communication security. The emphasis is on 
the security requirements of the industrial and commercial sectors, e.g. 
telecommunications, finance, banking, etc. The primary focus is on high 
quality original unpublished research, case studies and implementation 
experiences. We also encourage submission of papers addressing the social 
and legal aspects of security. Conference proceedings will be published by 
ACM. Selected papers, with suitable revisions, will be considered for 
publication in upcoming special issues of the Communications of the ACM and 
IEEE Communications Magazine. Topics of interest include:

Communications & Information Security: Theory and Techniques
------------------------------------------------------------

Access Control	Cryptanalysis	Digital Signatures	Intrusion Detection
Audit		Cryptosystems	Formal Models		Randomness
Authentication	Crypto. Prtcls	Hash Functions		Viruses and Worms
Authorization	Database Sec.	Integrity		Zero Knowledge

Applications,Case Studies & Experiences
---------------------------------------

Cellular and Wireless	LAN Security		Security APIs	Smart Cards
Electronic Commerce	Network Firewalls	Security Arch.	Telecom. Sec.
Enterprise Security	Open Systems Security	Security Mgmt.	WAN Security

Social and Policy Issues
------------------------

Cryptographic standards	Information Priv.	Legal Issues	Tech. Export


Instructions for Authors
========================

Authors should submit five copies of their papers to Ravi Ganesan at the 
address below by May 15, 1993. Papers should not exceed 7500 words (approx. 
15 single spaced pages of 11pt), and should not have been published or 
submitted else where. As the review process will be anonymous, names and 
affiliations of authors should appear only on a separate cover sheet. Authors 
will be notified of review decisions by July 15, 1993. Camera ready copies of 
accepted papers are due back by August 15, 1993 for inclusion in the 
Conference proceedings.


Program Committee
=================

Victoria Ashby, MITRE			Steve Bellovin, AT&T Bell Labs.	
Whitfield Diffie, SUN Microsystems	Taher El Gamal, RSA 
Deborah Estrin, Univ. of Southern CA	Joan Feigenbaum, AT&T Bell Labs.
Virgil Gligor, Univ. of Maryland	Li Gong, ORA Corp.
Richard Graveman, Bellcore		Sushil Jajodia, George Mason U
Paul Karger, GTE			Carl Landwehr, NRL	
E. Stewart Lee, Univ. of Toronto	Giancarlo Martella, Univ. of Milan
Michael Merritt, AT&T Bell Labs		Jonathan Millen, MITRE
Clifford Neuman, USC Info. Sci. Inst.	Steven Rudich, CMU		
Rainer Rueppel, Crypto AG		Eugene Spafford, Purdue Univ	
Jacques Stern, DMI-GRECC		Michael Wiener, BNR		
Yacov Yacobi, Bellcore


Organizers
==========

General Chairs
--------------

Dorothy Denning				Raymond Pyle
Georgetown U				Bell Atlantic
Reiss 225				7th Floor, 11720 Beltsville Drive
Georgetown, DC 20057			Beltsville, MD 20705
denning@cs.georgetown.edu		rpyle@socrates.bell-atl.com


Program Chairs
--------------

Ravi Ganesan				Ravi Sandhu
Bell Atlantic				George Mason U
7th Flr, 11720 Beltsville Drive		ISSE Dept.
Beltsville, MD 20705			Fairfax, VA 22030
ravi@socrates.bell-atl.com		sandhu@sitevax.gmu.edu
Ph#: (301) 595-8439


Proceedings Chair and Treasurer		Local Arrangements Chair
-------------------------------		------------------------
Victoria Ashby				Catherine Hoover
MITRE					George Mason U
7525 Coleshire Drive,			Center for Professional Development
McLean, VA 22102			Fairfax, VA 22030
ashby@mitre.org				Ph#:(703) 993-2090




			**************************


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