[2681] in Kerberos
Re: Clipper chip
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ganesan)
Mon Apr 19 23:08:05 1993
From: bf4grjc@socrates.MIT.EDU (Ganesan)
To: dgrambih@unix11.eldec.com (Daniel Grambihler)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 19:10:41 -0500 (EDT)
Cc: kerberos@Athena.MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: <9304192235.AA15493@eldec.com> from "Daniel Grambihler" at Apr 19, 93 03:32:58 pm
Reply-To: bf4grjc@bell-atl.com
>
> Okay, maybe I'm displaying blatant ignorance here. If I am, someone PLEASE
> correct me. What's to prevent criminals, etc., from encrypting their data
> before it hits the encryption device? The whole thing seems pretty pointless
> to me unless all other encryption methods somehow are inoperable in conjuction
> with the Clipper chip.
>
> Daniel Grambihler
Fair question. This scheme (or for that matter Silvio Micali's fair public
key systems) ALL ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE PROBLEM YOU DESCRIBE. I BELIEVE
the thinking is that criminals will not go to the trouble to do the extra
encryption, and that you can still net lots of people this way.
The FBI which has experts on this issue believes (see Denning's article
in March 93, Commmunications of the ACM) that this is true. I personally,
(non-expert) believe terrorists and drug runners WILL do exactly what you
suggest. But on the other hand, the recent World Trade Tower center suspects
allegedly did lots of not so sophitciated things, so who knows?
Ravi
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Ravi Ganesan e-mail: ravi@socrates.bell-atl.com
IS SAS Corporate Network Planning v-mail: (301) 595-8439
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