[20022] in Kerberos_V5_Development

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Re: The PAC must be the first ad-element

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Isaac Boukris)
Mon Feb 3 04:32:56 2020

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From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 10:32:20 +0100
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To: krbdev@mit.edu, Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>,
        Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>, Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>,
        rharwood@redhat.com, Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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On Sat, Feb 1, 2020 at 2:05 AM Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Interestingly, in the trust case if the PAC is the first element the
> trusted windows KDC would remove the other element and leave only the
> PAC (if the other element was first, then it is not removed but it
> breaks service access).

This makes me think we may need a way to suppress some ad-types from
the request, which I think is not possible with the current API.  If
so, maybe we could add an out a param to sign_authdata() with a list
of ad-types to filter out.
In contrast, perhaps we can reduce the number of passed arguments by
mandating the use of krb5_db_get_authdata_info(), and not passing
header_server and header_key.
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