[35965] in bugtraq
Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Toomas Soome)
Wed Aug 4 18:34:52 2004
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 2004 23:11:48 +0300
From: Toomas Soome <Toomas.Soome@microlink.ee>
In-reply-to: <200408040845.27609.lionel.ferette@belnet.be>
To: lionel.ferette@belnet.be
Cc: vuln@hexview.com, full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com,
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Message-id: <41114304.4090403@microlink.ee>
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Lionel Ferette wrote:
> Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not only for
> Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart cards, I have
> conducted a few risk analysis about that. The conclusion has always been that
> if the PIN must be entered from a PC, and the attacker has means to install
> software on the system (through directed viruses, social engineering, etc),
> the game's over.
>
> The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered using a
> keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack raise
> significantly. But that is opening another can of worms, because there is
> (was?) no standard for card readers with attached pin pad (at the time,
> PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
>
at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement secured
communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that widely in
use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both PIN codes
and passphrases...
toomas
