[10271] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: biometrics
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Carl Ellison)
Sat Jan 26 22:14:59 2002
Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20020126183932.03435c10@localhost>
Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2002 18:39:32 -0800
From: Carl Ellison <cme@acm.org>
To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: <87adv0u90r.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
At 03:55 PM 1/26/2002 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
>"cryptography@summitsecurity.org" <cryptography@summitsecurity.org>
>writes:
>> Not wanting to have extended contest over this,
>
>I'm afraid I'm not letting it drop.
>
>> but all these absolutes in
>> the comments are just too simplistic. Devices can be made as
>> tamper-resistant as the threat- and value-model required.
>
>No, they can't. That's an engineering hope, not an engineering
>reality. The hope you're expressing is that "well, maybe we can't
>make it impossible to break this design, but we can make it cost
>more to
>break the system than breaking it will bring the bad guy, and we can
>do that without said tamper-resistance costing us more than we can
>afford."
I've heard rumor of an effort a while back to layer Thermite into a
printed circuit board, so that a machine could self-destruct in case
of tampering. I doubt it ever got reviewed by OSHA, however. :)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 6.5.8
iQA/AwUBPFNoY3PxfjyW5ytxEQIvlgCgowahUTOiGYpWHu/YhuJpGSfWzs4An2Cm
tiaRwxCxNE51RKtmS6F0f+UF
=8jjr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison cme@acm.org http://world.std.com/~cme |
| PGP: 08FF BA05 599B 49D2 23C6 6FFD 36BA D342 |
+--Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.-+
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
