[10315] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Fingerprints (was: Re: biometrics)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Eric Murray)
Mon Jan 28 20:17:11 2002
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 16:16:58 -0800
From: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
To: lynn.wheeler@firstdata.com
Cc: ji@research.att.com, cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Message-ID: <20020128161658.C7225@slack.lne.com>
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In-Reply-To: <OF05CF1CF1.8A0E0329-ON87256B4F.0076F1B1@internet.ny.fdms.firstdata.com>; from lynn.wheeler@firstdata.com on Mon, Jan 28, 2002 at 02:54:57PM -0700
On Mon, Jan 28, 2002 at 02:54:57PM -0700, lynn.wheeler@firstdata.com wrote:
>
> I believe NIST published something about FBI needing 40 minutia standard
> for registration in their database.
[reasons why the FBI wants so many minutae deleted]
As an example of the real world, a couple years ago I put together
a working demo of a smartcard authenticated by a fingerprint
(the card then went on to participate in SET). The pre-release
fingerprint chip I used would regularly grab about 20 minutae, more
like 10 on a bad scan (dirty finger, poor position, etc).
If you set the macthing parameters to require all minutae to match,
you'd get a positive (i.e. match all minutae) on about one in ten scans.
And of course the other reason for wanting such good prints is simply
that the FBI can demand them.
Eric
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