[10363] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Unbreakable? (fwd)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicholas Brawn)
Mon Feb 4 08:49:10 2002
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 17:47:30 +1100
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v480)
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
To: Sean McGrath <sean@manybits.net>
From: Nicholas Brawn <ncb@pobox.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.33.0202031659500.750-100000@allende.home>
Message-Id: <0F550573-193B-11D6-9998-000393471DA8@pobox.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't such a system feasible by:
1. Having the network infrastructure available to support the continuous
traffic loads.
2. Having a suitable RNG source that can cope with the reseeding/etc
requirements of encrypting bulk data.
3. Having a mechanism to insert genuine information into these massive
streams of data.
I suppose the issue is communicating to the third party which part of
the data contains the interesting stuff. From what Rabin is saying, it
appears that the increased security is achieved by the third party not
knowing what is important and what isn't. How you communicate this with
your trusted third party is the problem. You can't simply send a
transmission when a new section of interesting stuff is coming through,
because then the evil folk can simply watch for the notification, then
capture that section of the traffic.
Perhaps you could send a transmission that says "in x bytes time for the
next x bytes, is the next message". That would include some latency that
the evil third party can't reliably interperet. But does that work for
frequent transmissions?
Seems interesting nevertheless.
Nick
--
Real friends help you move bodies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
