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Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <p05101203b88496e797cb@[207.172.166.129]> In-Reply-To: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A01E90C03@exna07.securitydynamics.com> Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 14:55:23 -0800 To: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>, marius <marius.corbu@analog.com>, "'Ben Laurie'" <ben@algroup.co.uk> From: Jon Simon <jon@jonsimon.com> Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" At 11:00 AM -0500 2/4/02, Trei, Peter wrote: >Don't forget that the MITM attack (which Schneier claims >takes 2^(2n) = 2^112 time), also requires 2^56 blocks >of storage. That's a lot, and the attack ceases to be >parallelizable, unlike the straight brute-force attack. >In fact, it's utterly intractable at the moment. Here's >why: > >2^56 bytes = 72 petabytes, and >I suspect you'd need 8 bytes per entry, or >about 1/2 an exabyte. With 120GB drives starting at about $200, the storage requirements can be met today, albeit not cheaply. In four years or so, when we have 1TB drives, it will just be that much easier. But I'm not losing any sleep either. -Jon Simon -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
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