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Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (V Alex Brennen)
Fri Mar 29 16:22:50 2002

Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 18:52:29 -0500 (EST)
From: V Alex Brennen <vab@e-techservices.com>
To: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com>
Cc: <cypherpunks@lne.com>, <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.1.20020325231829.02684b30@idiom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.33.0203281824550.22563-100000@unagi.e-techservices.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Bill Stewart wrote:

> While SSL implementations are mostly 1024 bits these days,
> aren't PGP Diffie-Hellman keys usually 1536 bits?

I think there's a general consensus that the minimum
recommended key size for X9.42 Diffie-Hellman PGP keys 
is 1024bits.  I'm not sure if the standard size is 1536bits.
I  might be wrong, but I don't believe such a key length
standard exists. I think the only size related limitation
in X9.42 was related only to size of the prime defining
the Galos Field.  I haven't worked with X9.42 before.

There does not appear to be many 1536bit keys in the global PGP
public keyring (the keys of the synchronized public keyservers).

I count 1,057 in my copy of the ring, or 0.0748% of the
total keys in the ring.

Here is more information about that ring:

http://gnv.us.ks.cryptnet.net/stats.html

Notice the % of keys which is =< 1024bits. 


	- VAB
---
V. Alex Brennen
Senior Systems Engineer
IBM Certified Specialist
e-TechServices.com
IBM Business Partner
Bus: 352.246.8553
Fax: 770.216.1877
vab@e-techservices.com
http://www.e-techservices.com/people/vab/


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