[10700] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Schneier on Bernstein factoring machine
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Matt Crawford)
Tue Apr 16 20:27:52 2002
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 14:51:53 -0500
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
In-reply-to: "16 Apr 2002 20:44:06 +0200."
<755111c1c4c1eb673cac766510c5a354@remailer.privacy.at>
To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Message-id: <200204161951.g3GJprZ11137@gungnir.fnal.gov>
> > Businesses today could
> > reasonably be content with their 1024-bit keys, and military institutions
> > and those paranoid enough to fear from them should have upgraded years ago.
> >
> > To me, the big news in Lucky Green's announcement is not that he believes
> > that Bernstein's research is sufficiently worrisome as to warrant revoking
> > his 1024-bit keys; it's that, in 2002, he still has 1024-bit keys to revoke.
>
> Does anyone else notice the contradiction in these two paragraphs?
> First Bruce says that businesses can reasonably be content with 1024 bit
> keys, then he appears shocked that Lucky Green still has a 1024 bit key?
> Why is it so awful for Lucky to "still" have a key of this size, if 1024
> bit keys are good enough to be "reasonably content" about?
No contradiction at all. "[M]ilitary institutions and those paranoid
enough to fear from them should have upgraded years ago." Anyone
paranoid enough to think Bernstein's back-of-the-very-large-envelope
calculation makes a 1024-bit key insecure should have already been
concerned enough to think that SOMEthing would do so.
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