[11265] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Thu Aug 1 18:43:13 2002
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: cypherpunks@lne.com, cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 14:33:43 -0700
In-reply-to: <a019a1430266689f90073a6c9f93aafb@aarg.net>
--
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could
> run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be
> changed and restrictions added.
Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed
around them, is disturbingly similar to what would be needed to
restrict what software we could run. TCPA institutions and
infrastructure are much the same as SSSCA institutions and
infrastructure.
According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
But this is not what the content providers want. They want that
if you disable the Fritz chip, the computer does not boot. What
they want is that it shall be illegal to sell a computer capable
of booting if the Fritz chip is disabled.
If I have to give superroot powers to Joe in order to run Joe's
software or play Joe's content, fair enough. But the hardware and
institutions to implement this are disturbingly similar to the
hardware and institutions needed to implement the rule that I have
to give superroot powers to Joe in order to play Peter's software
or content..
--digsig
James A. Donald
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FQhKMpDHys7gyFWenHCK9p7+Xfh1DwpaqGKcztxk
20jFdJDiigV/b1fmHBudici59omqc/Ze0zXBVvQLk
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