[11340] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: dangers of TCPA/palladium
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Lucky Green)
Tue Aug 6 10:19:02 2002
From: "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to>
To: <cypherpunks@lne.com>, <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2002 02:24:55 -0700
In-reply-to: <09fdc16bc6a040e13686c9150aca01d9@aarg.net>
Anonymous writes:
>
> Adam Back writes:
> > To address privacy with for example Brands digital credentials, the
> > underlying cryptography may be harder to understand, or at
> least less
> > familiar, but I don't think using a toolkit based on Brands digital
> > credentials would be significantly harder than using an identity or
> > attribute based PKI toolkit. Similar for Chaum's
> credentials or other
> > approach.
>
> Sure, but how many pages would it take in the spec to
> describe the protocol? Especially given their turgid
> technical-writer prose? Brands took a whole book to describe
> his credentials thoroughly.
>
> In any case, I agree that something like this would be an
> excellent enhancement to the technology. IMO it is very much
> in the spirit of TCPA. I suspect they would be very open to
> this suggestion.
Though routinely professing otherwise, evidently Anonymous knows nothing
of the spirit of the TCPA: I proposed the use of blinding schemes to the
TCPA as far back as 2 years ago as a substitute to the Privacy CAs
schemes which are subject to potential collusion. I believe
"unreceptive", rather than "very much open to this suggestion" would
more accurately describe the TCPA's spirit Anonymous holds so high.
--Lucky Green
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