[11415] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Thanks, Lucky, for helping to kill gnutella
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bram Cohen)
Fri Aug 9 16:40:10 2002
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 11:59:05 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bram Cohen <bram@gawth.com>
To: AARG!Anonymous <remailer@aarg.net>
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com, Crypto List <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
In-Reply-To: <8c25bf764b14de9e2d3d9cd24a6d49fb@aarg.net>
AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> If only there were a technology in which clients could verify and yes,
> even trust, each other remotely. Some way in which a digital certificate
> on a program could actually be verified, perhaps by some kind of remote,
> trusted hardware device. This way you could know that a remote system was
> actually running a well-behaved client before admitting it to the net.
> This would protect Gnutella from not only the kind of opportunistic
> misbehavior seen today, but the future floods, attacks and DOSing which
> will be launched in earnest once the content companies get serious about
> taking this network down.
Before claiming that the TCPA, which is from a deployment standpoint
vaporware, could help with gnutella's scaling problems, you should
probably learn something about what gnutella's problems are first. The
truth is that gnutella's problems are mostly that it's a screamer
protocol, and limiting which clients could connect would do nothing to fix
that.
Limiting which clients could connect to the gnutella network would,
however, do a decent job of forcing to pay people for one of the
commercial clients. In this way it's very typical of how TCPA works - a
non-solution to a problem, but one which could potentially make money, and
has the support of gullible dupes who know nothing about the technical
issues involved.
> Be sure and send a note to the Gnutella people reminding them of all
> you're doing for them, okay, Lucky?
Your personal vendetta against Lucky is very childish.
-Bram Cohen
"Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent"
-- John Maynard Keynes
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