[1153] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Better DES challenge update
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Andreas Bogk)
Wed Jul 2 17:13:10 1997
To: die@die.com
Cc: eli@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu, cryptography@c2.net, crisp@netcom.com
From: Andreas Bogk <andreas@artcom.de>
Date: 02 Jul 1997 04:47:51 +0200
In-Reply-To: Dave Emery's message of Mon, 30 Jun 1997 23:21:44 -0400 (EDT)
>>>>> "Dave" == Dave Emery <die@pig.die.com> writes:
Dave> card with little added support overhead. Most previous
Dave> proposals presumed that additional tests would be done in
Dave> software past the initial trial decryption of 8 bytes - this
Dave> would require a lot of chip to chip communications and all
Dave> the baggage in the form of wide busses and fast interchip
Dave> communications that this would entail.
In the classic DES case, false hits won't happen very often. If you
target ATM machines, where you know only part of the plaintext (the
PIN), such additional tests on-chip were neccessary, of course.
Andreas
--
Get rid of C++ and yourself a Dylan compiler at legend.gwydion.cs.cmu.edu!
