[11672] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Anne & Lynn Wheeler)
Tue Sep 17 19:29:35 2002
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 16:40:53 -0600
To: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: <am6ggu$g97$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>
At 06:02 AM 9/17/2002 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>I wasn't thinking of pure software solutions. I was thinking of a
>combination of existing hardware + new software: use the MMU to provide
>separate address spaces, and use a secure VM or OS kernel to limit what
>those processes can do. As far as I can see, this can provide just as
>much protection against viruses for your bank account as Palladium can.
>
>In general, with software and existing hardware working together, I
>suspect we can already do everything Palladium can do, except for the DRM
>and related applications founded on taking control away from the owner
>of the machine. Maybe I'm missing something. Still, it seems to me that
>Palladium would much more compelling if it left out the tamper-resistant
>chip and gave up on the semi-coercive DRM-like applications.
couple refs to multics study
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#8 Backdoor in AES ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#10 Backdoor in AES ?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler lynn@garlic.com, http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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