[11881] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Aram Perez)
Tue Oct 22 01:49:01 2002
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2002 22:34:40 -0700
From: Aram Perez <aram@pacbell.net>
To: Cryptography <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.4.33.0210212143520.14823-100000@sasas1>
Victor.Duchovni@morganstanley.com wrote:
[snip]
>
> With keyed MACs Alice and Bob share the same secretkeys, either can
> freely generate messages with correct MAC values, so the MAC cannot be
> used as evidence to a third party that Alice is the signer of the
> message.
While you are correct in the general case, I have worked on a system where
Alice could only generate MACs and Bob could only verify MACs. The hardware
was designed so that Alice could not verify MACs and Bob could not generate
MACs even though they shared the same key (that was only known to the
hardware).
Regards,
Aram Perez
[snip]
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