[1221] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Center for Security Policy calls for domestic key escrow
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Informati)
Fri Jul 18 14:49:44 1997
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 14:36:41 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT@hobbes.orl.mmc.com>
To: declan@well.com
CC: cryptography@c2.net
>Similar arguments have proven effective in obtaining
>Administration support for the wholesale elimination
>of export controls on powerful computers -- even
>supercomputers.
...
>-- historically an area of decisive and strategically
>vital advantage for the United States.(1) Evidently,
>they are no more concerned by the other side of this
>coin: Thanks to the Clinton-approved transfer of
>American supercomputers and other powerful data
>processing systems, foreign governments are likely to
>have much enhanced capabilities to perform their own
>code-breaking operations, further reducing U.S.
>dominance in the field.
Interesting: the article seems to arguing against the use
of strong crypto by US citizens while admitting that the
foreign capacity for codebreaking is increasing. Did I
miss something there ?
IMNSHO the use of strong crypto will reduce the incidence of
high-tech crime far more than it will increase the difficulty
of law enforcement to investigate. Mr. Freeh seems to have missed
the fact that when cars became available that could outrun LEA
vehicles, the answer was not to require governors but to use
radio for pusuit.
Similarly, means exist to capture the information at the endpoints
reguardless of the difficuty of tapping in the middle.
Podi-pedi-poliphiles will not go away if communications are restricted,
they existed hundreds of years before the first bit became a byte. I
suspect the PTB are intelligent enough to realize this. Given that, the
question is "what is the real agenda ?" Is *not* control of crypto -
that is already beyond control as will become evident in 1998. So what's
it all about ?
Warmly,
Padgett
