[12652] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Francois Grieu)
Thu Mar 6 15:13:48 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To:
<F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A04D4A63F@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2003 18:58:48 +0100
To: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
From: Francois Grieu <fgrieu@micronet.fr>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Peter Trei wrote:
> I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
> station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
> This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
> described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows
> the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy record,
> already certified by the voter as accurate.
Then there is the problem that the printed receipt must not be usable
to determine who voted for who, even knowing in which order the
voters went to the machine. Therefore the printed receipts must be
shuffled. Which brings us straight back to papers in a box, that we
shake before opening.
Every way I look at it, electronic voting has a hard time to match
the resilience to abuse of the traditional
bulletin-in-an-enveloppe-in-a-box.
Francois Grieu
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