[12673] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Kelsey)
Fri Mar 7 00:19:30 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2003 16:53:24 -0500
To: Ian Brown <I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk>, 'Ed Gerck' <egerck@nma.com>,
cryptography <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
From: John Kelsey <kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com>
Cc: Rebecca Mercuri <notable@mindspring.com>
In-Reply-To: <000001c2e389$ab2b94e0$6601a8c0@happy>
At 02:39 AM 3/6/03 +0000, Ian Brown wrote:
>Ed Gerck wrote:
...
> > For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by
> > using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera,
> > obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the
> > vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.
>
>As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a
>mechanical voting machine.
The big theoretical question is whether you could tell whether the
vote-seller was faking it. A design goal ought to be to make plausible
fake proofs of how you voted easy to generate, IMO. Why only sell your
vote to one side, when you can sell it to both sides multiple times?
In practice, if it's more trouble to generate fakes than to just vote and
bring the proof to sell, then the individual vote seller will probably just
vote as he's told. After all, most people eligible to vote don't bother
most of the time; presumably, they just don't care that much who wins the
next election. I assume most people who sell their votes aren't committed
ideologues who are selling out their cause, but rather people who didn't
much care either way. (But surely someone, somewhere has real data on this.)
--John Kelsey, kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com
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