[12676] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: multiple system - Re: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Kelsey)
Fri Mar 7 12:48:14 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2003 00:52:24 -0500
To: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>, "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
From: John Kelsey <kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com>
Cc: 'Francois Grieu' <fgrieu@micronet.fr>,
cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: <3E67AEBE.67388B75@nma.com>
At 12:25 PM 3/6/03 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
>"Trei, Peter" wrote:
> > Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual
> > system (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to
> > attack then either alone.
>
>The dual, and multiple, system can be done without paper ballot.
>There is nothing "magic" about paper as a record medium.
I think one benefit of using paper ballots as the backup is that there are
already pretty well-understood ways to deal with paper ballots. I like the
idea of the election observers having at least one piece of the technology
they really understand.
>I
>can send a link for a paper on this that was presented at the
>Tomales Bay conference on voting systems last year, using Shannon's
>Tenth Theorem as the theoretical background, introducing the idea
>of multiple "witnesses". If two witnesses are not 100% mutually
>dependent, the probability that both witnesses may fail at the same
>time is smaller than that of any single witness to fail.
Is the relevant question here about probabilistic failures, or about
conspiracies? Clearly, the size and cost of the conspiracy gets much
bigger if there's a check value on the election results that is handled
completely outside the voting machine.
>Cheers,
>Ed Gerck
--John Kelsey, kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com
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