[1270] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Crypto Hearing Transcript
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Mon Jul 28 18:28:09 1997
In-Reply-To: <v03007800b002b4c6e73c@[172.17.1.150]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 1997 18:10:15 -0400
To: Rick Smith <smith@securecomputing.com>, cryptography@c2.net
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Rick Smith <smith@securecomputing.com> points out:
>
>Perhaps Crowell's testimony can even be turned on its head: history
>suggests that cryptosystems are so subtle and complex that nobody can use
>them on a large scale without leaving a few holes. So, if the FBI wants to
>read the Cartel's e-mail, their chances of success are as good if they hack
>their way into the e-mail servers as if they use the Cartel's escrowed
>keys. This is consistent with my own observations of crypto use in the real
>world and with everything I've read: people get sloppy with security when
>they have real work to do.
>
One could go even further and suggest that the FBI, et al, would do better
without key escrow, since the bad guys would get chatty, expecting crypto
to protect them. The worst enemy of wiretappers is silence.
Arnold Reinhold
