[146361] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Sun Aug 25 19:52:23 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 19:52:04 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
To: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@huitema.net>
In-Reply-To: <07c601cea1ec$d40c9030$7c25b090$@huitema.net>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, 'Ralph Holz' <ralph-cryptometzger@ralphholz.de>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 16:42:57 -0700 "Christian Huitema"
<huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
> I studied such systems intensely, and designed some
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_Name_Resolution_Protocol). Using
> a distributed hash table securely is really hard. The basic idea of
> DHT is that information is spread on the network based on matches
> between the hash of a resource identifier and the hash of a node
> identifier. All nodes are effectively relying on every other node.
> In an open network, that is pretty much equivalent to "relying on
> the goodness of strangers." You can be sure that if our buddies at
> the NSA set up to watch the content of a DHT, they will succeed.
That is not my worry. Signing the data posted to the DHT can prevent
spoofing, querying it over a mix network or using a PIR protocol can
prevent eavesdropping. I'm more worried about various sorts of denial
of service attacks, or service being shut down by inadvertent
behavior.
Perry
--
Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
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