[146435] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
[Cryptography] human readable IDs,
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Wed Aug 28 08:43:30 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 08:43:13 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
To: Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
In-Reply-To: <3EF86462-A5AA-4E10-9642-C8BAAD37E0C1@lrw.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
First of all, I think systems that make people associate arbitrary
long strings with someone's email address aren't really acceptable.
I'll repeat that my model is "give someone your email address on a
napkin in a bar". I do things like this often enough right now.
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 06:41:27 -0400 Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
wrote:
> On the underlying matter of changing my public key: *Why* would I
> have to change it?
Because people make mistakes and reveal security critical information
to the world at intervals. Because computers are sometimes
compromised. A system that does not permit you to recover from rare
events is not going to deploy very well.
I think that to begin with, though, a system that requires people to
somehow associate arbitrary strings with their friends won't work
either.
Anyway, I proposed a system to handle id to key mappings with
reasonable trust in the first of my three messages on my proposed new
model -- it also happens to handle revocation reasonably well
(though imperfectly).
Perry
--
Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
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