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Re: [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dirk-Willem van Gulik)
Fri Sep 6 10:09:03 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org>
In-Reply-To: <20130905190947.4338b634@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 09:29:33 +0200
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com


Op 6 sep. 2013, om 01:09 heeft "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com> het =
volgende geschreven:

> http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-sur=
veillance
=85.
> The Suite B curves were picked some time ago. Maybe they have problems.
=85.
> Now, this certainly was a problem for the random number generator
> standard, but is it an actual worry in other contexts? I tend not to
> believe that but I'm curious about opinions.

Given the use, including that of the wider security/intelligence community,=
 I'd expect any issues to be more with very specific curves (either tweaked=
 to be that way; or through soft means promoted/pushed/suggested those who =
by happenstance have an issue) that with the ECC as an algorithm/technology=
 class. As anything deeper than a curve would assume very aligned/top-down =
control and little political entropy. Not something which 'just the' signal=
 intelligence community could easily enforce on the other cats.

Dw
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