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X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com From: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@huitema.net> To: "'Naif M. Otaibi'" <otaibinm@gmail.com>, "'Jaap-Henk Hoepman'" <jhh@cs.ru.nl> In-Reply-To: <CAC_smCkoZDEGviybZiHiMGMPBdGWXbwHv1J4JJ1eqD6peqf9-g@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 12:25:35 -0700 Cc: 'Crypto' <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, 'Jon Callas' <jon@callas.org> Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com This is a multipart message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0258_01CEABC5.5B7D5310 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Another argument is =E2=80=9Cminimal dependency.=E2=80=9D If you use = public key, you depend on both the public key algorithm, to establish = the key, and the symmetric key algorithm, to protect the session. If you = just use symmetric key, you depend on only one algorithm. Of course, that means getting pair-wise shared secrets, and protecting = them. Whether that=E2=80=99s harder or more fragile than maintaining a = key ring is a matter of debate. It is probably more robust than relying = on CA. - -- Christian Huitema -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) Comment: Using gpg4o v3.1.107.3564 - http://www.gpg4o.de/ Charset: utf-8 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSK32sAAoJELba05IUOHVQYEQH/iugLUvpdwZoNbtZCXFoB4O8 yP+h6RdcKIraCZww/vrUeXYodfqn9AHWHfQmf0Gx6VlEpXMasJqi8DMR4Fyy4iAk kq5GfuGITBZjeN3gW2Xf20wK0P5nFCgD0sK0sDwuYVZmx6K5Qc4uFt4VNooCoewe rDk48vMRkJnz409M0YXU6Fnxrl7Tm0Tuk513HwAJjNetO1OLH7vznP+iGkZjdbxp CzGuqZuEFwl2gm7TT0I+sciTRoRiVSBmNu+fxNOai9bo2vMUG4eVjSLX+mqRcAbe fVmpSCf9BcA01DLUlRgHityfM9HzdEbQKjdX8QvT4YCI6X7wZ21zTKB2G8ISiwI=3D =3Dd5yn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------=_NextPart_000_0258_01CEABC5.5B7D5310 Content-Type: text/html; name="PGPexch.htm" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="PGPexch.htm" <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" = xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" = xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" = xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta name=3DGenerator = content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)"><style><!-- /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:"Cambria Math"; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; text-decoration:underline;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; text-decoration:underline;} span.hoenzb {mso-style-name:hoenzb;} span.EmailStyle18 {mso-style-type:personal-reply; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; color:#1F497D;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; font-size:10.0pt;} @page WordSection1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} --></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" /> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit"> <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" /> </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue = vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'>Another argument is “minimal dependency.” If you use = public key, you depend on both the public key algorithm, to establish = the key, and the symmetric key algorithm, to protect the session. If you = just use symmetric key, you depend on only one = algorithm.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'>Of course, that means getting pair-wise shared secrets, and = protecting them. Whether that’s harder or more fragile than = maintaining a key ring is a matter of debate. It is probably more robust = than relying on CA.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D;mso-ligatures:standard'>-- Christian Huitema<o:p></o:p></span></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497= D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div></body></html> ------=_NextPart_000_0258_01CEABC5.5B7D5310 Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="PGPexch.htm.sig" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="PGPexch.htm.sig" iQEcBAABAgAGBQJSK32tAAoJELba05IUOHVQ+6AH/A+jEI+xticKd808tC+33q8zqcV2blWPT754 xdcuz0dEjzBItkQkSvQ9FZLKW8cppVbf5ZVIN+/I5AYo/+01/nhAiOPf40JJHr8exuCwVnpqaql2 ZVP/fU8l6FD57z4C75/nQS1ijaHbfSUVzTi8CeiyY5i0J/Hpq4t9618qBz5XSj39QXjg9NiYhjY3 IZIwpNSF2qzaTo4LPBq5p4j5QMLy4XtDzF8vvF0rTd3IhZNhmS2fwZGDUWv6Tz+k3fM+UCRkL3zC 7TWNz5PK5Qe5fTnSSzHomJHon3WZ23qYNsGJtG3V5xSLnZl9dsPaNcmIP9tj6oXdXUCd8CDG2Kfd x6k= ------=_NextPart_000_0258_01CEABC5.5B7D5310 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ------=_NextPart_000_0258_01CEABC5.5B7D5310--
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