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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Tue Sep 10 17:52:37 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <105671C0-9159-468C-98F4-1645406121DD@hopcount.ca>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 22:35:05 +0100
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,
	"cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

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On 10 September 2013 22:04, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:

> Suppose Mallory has access to the private keys of CAs which are in "the"
> browser list or otherwise widely-trusted.
>
> An on-path attack between Alice and Bob would allow Mallory to terminate
> Alice's TLS connection, presenting an opportunistically-generated
> server-side certificate with signatures that allow it to be trusted by
> Alice without pop-ups and warnings. Instantiating a corresponding session
> with Bob and ALGing the plaintext through with interception is then
> straightforward.
>

CT makes this impossible to do undetected, of course.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On 10 September 2013 22:04, Joe Abley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:jabley@hopcount.ca" target=3D"_blank">jabley@hopcount.ca</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div id=3D":7x4" style=3D"overflow:hidden">S=
uppose Mallory has access to the private keys of CAs which are in &quot;the=
&quot; browser list or otherwise widely-trusted.<br>

<br>
An on-path attack between Alice and Bob would allow Mallory to terminate Al=
ice&#39;s TLS connection, presenting an opportunistically-generated server-=
side certificate with signatures that allow it to be trusted by Alice witho=
ut pop-ups and warnings. Instantiating a corresponding session with Bob and=
 ALGing the plaintext through with interception is then straightforward.<br=
>
</div></blockquote></div><br>CT makes this impossible to do undetected, of =
course.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div></div>

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