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Re: Netscape SSL Patent

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Jablon)
Fri Sep 12 12:13:46 1997

Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 10:11:44 -0400
To: 3umoelle@informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?= ),
        cryptography@c2.net
From: David Jablon <dpj@world.std.com>
In-Reply-To: <9709111741.AA16992@public.uni-hamburg.de>

At 07:41 PM 9/11/97 +0200, Ulf M=F6ller wrote:
>----- Forwarded message from Dan Park -----
>Craig R.P. Heath wrote:
>>
>> I don't know how many people are aware of this, but Netscape have
>> just been granted a patent on SSL - US Patent number 5,657,390.

Interesting.

The claims potentially cover much more than SSL.
Here's some more information, plus a two-minute analysis.

	5657390:   Secure socket layer application program
	               apparatus and method=20
	INVENTORS: Elgamal; Taher, Palo Alto, CA
	           Hickman; Kipp E. B., Los Altos, CA
	ASSIGNEES: Netscape Communications Corporation, Mountain View, CA
	ISSUED:    Aug. 12, 1997
	FILED:     Aug. 25, 1995

There are three independent claims, which seem to be restatements
of the same thing.  Here's the shortest version:

	3. A method of encrypting and decrypting information
	transferred over a network between a client application
	program running in a client computer and a server application
	program running in a server computer, the method comprising:

		providing a socket application program interface
			to an application layer program;
 [*]		providing encrypted information to transport protocol
			layer services;
		encrypting information received from an application
		    layer program; and
		decrypting information received from transport protocol
			layer services.

Presuming that Netscape intends to enforce this, and
that others might want to challenge it, to survive it
must be novel over newly cited prior art.  The main thing
that makes it potentially different than many other
encrypted transport layers is the phrase I marked with a [*].

It might only take one good example of earlier work that
used any kind of encrypted data to control the
transport layer to invalidate this.
A big weakness here is that there are no narrower claims.
The "encrypted information" is nowhere limited to
being digitally signed, so purely symmetric techniques
are relevant.

------------------------------------
David Jablon
Integrity Sciences, Inc.
dpj@world.std.com
<http://world.std.com/~dpj/>


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