[147037] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Yaron Sheffer)
Wed Sep 11 15:29:16 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2013 22:27:03 +0300
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Alan Braggins <alan.braggins@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <52303DCB.50603@gmail.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 09/11/2013 12:54 PM, Alan Braggins wrote:
> On 10/09/13 15:58, james hughes wrote:
>> On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:10 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com
>> <mailto:bascule@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org
>>> <mailto:ben@links.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>> And the brief summary is: there's only one ciphersuite left that's
>>> good, and unfortunately its only available in TLS 1.2:
>>>
>>> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>>>
>>> A lot of people don't like GCM either ;)
>>
>> Yes, GCM does have implementation sensitivities particularly around the
>> IV generation. That being said, the algorithm is better than most and
>> the implementation sensitivity obvious (don't ever reuse an IV).
>
> I think the difficulty of getting a fast constant time implementation on
> platforms without AES-NI type hardware support are more of a concern.
Is this any different from plain old AES-CBC?
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