[147059] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Gilmore)
Thu Sep 12 10:31:22 2013
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To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, gnu@toad.com
In-reply-to: <CAMm+LwgxovYFPZj3JhxaqnpY4aSDxfT6k3h2qsgjO3Pt0mTGcg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2013 20:00:06 -0700
From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
> > I wouldn't mind if it had been called Pretty Good Forward Secrecy instead,
> > but it really is a lot better than regular public key.
>
> My point was that the name is misleading and causes people to look for more
> than is there.
There doesn't seem to be much downside to just calling it "Forward
Secrecy" rather than "Perfect Forward Secrecy". We all seem to agree
that it isn't perfect, and that it is a step forward in security, at a
moderate cost in latency and performance.
John
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