[147094] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Fri Sep 13 12:12:33 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 12:12:28 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
To: Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org>
In-Reply-To: <20130913094924.GW10405@leitl.org>
Cc: Cryptography List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 11:49:24 +0200 Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org>
wrote:
>
> http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf
>
> Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans[...]
This is pretty clearly a big deal. The fact that you can skew HRNGs
just by fiddling with dopant levels is something I would have
suspected, but now that we know, I think need for chip companies
to provide access to the raw HRNG output has become even more obvious.
It is not a question of not trusting the engineers who work on the
hardware. It is a question of not wanting to trust every
single individual in a long supply chain.
Perry
--
Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
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