[147102] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nico Williams)
Fri Sep 13 17:02:15 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 15:46:58 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
In-Reply-To: <20130913151735.21c4d89b@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com>
Cc: Nemo <nemo@self-evident.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>,
cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 03:17:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 14:53:28 -0500 Nico Williams
> <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> > Traffic analysis can't really be defeated, not in detail.
>
> What's wrong with mix networks?
First: you can probably be observed using them. Unless too many people
use mix networks you might just end up attracting unwanted attention:
more passive surveillance, maybe even active attacks (at the limit very
physical attacks).
Second: I suspect that to be most effective the mix network also has to
be most inconvenient (high latency, for example). That probably means
mix networks won't be popular enough to help with the first problem.
Third: the mix network had better cross multiple jurisdictions that are
not accustomed to cooperating with each other. This seems very
difficult to arrange.
I'd love to be disabused of the above though.
Nico
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