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X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com In-Reply-To: <20130913171243.1ce2325e@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2013 17:23:40 +0100 From: Max Kington <mkington@webhanger.com> To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com> Cc: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk@gmail.com>, "cryptography@metzdowd.com List" <cryptography@metzdowd.com> Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com --===============2265784337753240856== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0122e6e6daac6a04e65a642c --089e0122e6e6daac6a04e65a642c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 10:12 PM, Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com>wrote: > On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 16:55:05 -0400 John Kelsey <crypto.jmk@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Everyone, > > > > The more I think about it, the more important it seems that any > > anonymous email like communications system *not* include people who > > don't want to be part of it, and have lots of defenses to prevent > > its anonymous communications from becoming a nightmare for its > > participants. If the goal is to make PRISM stop working and make > > the email part of the internet go dark for spies (which definitely > > includes a lot more than just US spies!), then this system has to > > be something that lots of people will want to use. > > > > There should be multiple defenses against spam and phishing and > > other nasty things being sent in this system, with enough > > designed-in flexibility to deal with changes in attacker behavior > > over tome. > > Indeed. As I said in the message I just pointed Nico at: > http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/016874.html > > Quoting myself: > > Spam might be a terrible, terrible problem in such a network since > it could not easily be traced to a sender and thus not easily > blocked, but there's an obvious solution to that. I've been using > Jabber, Facebook and other services where all or essentially all > communications require a bi-directional decision to enable messages > for years now, and there is virtually no spam in such systems > because of it. So, require such bi-directional "friending" within > our postulated new messaging network -- authentication is handled > by the public keys of course. > The keys. This to me is the critical point for widespread adoption, key management. How do you do this in a way that doesn't put people off immediately. There are two new efforts I'm aware if trying to solve this in a user friendly way are https://parley.co/#how-it-works and http://mailpile.is. Parley's approach does at least deal with the longevity of the private key although it does boil security down to a password, if I can obtain their packet and the salt I can probably brute force the password. I've exchanged mails with the mailpile.is guys and I think they're still looking at the options. Max --089e0122e6e6daac6a04e65a642c Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail= _quote">On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 10:12 PM, Perry E. Metzger <span dir=3D"ltr= "><<a href=3D"mailto:perry@piermont.com" target=3D"_blank">perry@piermon= t.com</a>></span> wrote:<br> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-= left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p= adding-left:1ex">On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 16:55:05 -0400 John Kelsey <<a href= =3D"mailto:crypto.jmk@gmail.com">crypto.jmk@gmail.com</a>><br> wrote:<br> <div class=3D"im">> Everyone,<br> ><br> > The more I think about it, the more important it seems that any<br> > anonymous email like communications system *not* include people who<br= > > don't want to be part of it, and have lots of defenses to prevent<= br> > its anonymous communications from becoming a nightmare for its<br> > participants. =A0If the goal is to make PRISM stop working and make<br= > > the email part of the internet go dark for spies (which definitely<br> > includes a lot more than just US spies!), then this system has to<br> > be something that lots of people will want to use.<br> ><br> > There should be multiple defenses against spam and phishing and<br> > other nasty things being sent in this system, with enough<br> > designed-in flexibility to deal with changes in attacker behavior<br> > over tome.<br> <br> </div>Indeed. As I said in the message I just pointed Nico at:<br> <a href=3D"http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/01687= 4.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/20= 13-August/016874.html</a><br> <br> Quoting myself:<br> <br> =A0 =A0Spam might be a terrible, terrible problem in such a network since<b= r> =A0 =A0it could not easily be traced to a sender and thus not easily<br> =A0 =A0blocked, but there's an obvious solution to that. I've been = using<br> =A0 =A0Jabber, Facebook and other services where all or essentially all<br> =A0 =A0communications require a bi-directional decision to enable messages<= br> =A0 =A0for years now, and there is virtually no spam in such systems<br> =A0 =A0because of it. So, require such bi-directional "friending"= within<br> =A0 =A0our postulated new messaging network -- authentication is handled<br= > =A0 =A0by the public keys of course.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><p dir= =3D"ltr" style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">The keys. Th= is to me is the critical point for widespread adoption, key management. How= do you do this in a way that doesn't put people off immediately.</p> <p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">There = are two new efforts I'm aware if trying to solve this in a user friendl= y way are=A0<a href=3D"https://parley.co/#how-it-works" target=3D"_blank">h= ttps://parley.co/#how-it-works</a>=A0and=A0<a href=3D"http://mailpile.is/" = target=3D"_blank">http://mailpile.is</a>.</p> <p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">Parley= 's approach does at least deal with the longevity of the private key al= though it does boil security down to a password, if I can obtain their pack= et and the salt I can probably brute force the password.</p> <div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">I've e= xchanged mails with the</span><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;f= ont-size:13px">=A0</span><a href=3D"http://mailpile.is/" target=3D"_blank" = style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">mailpile.is</a><span = style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">=A0</span><span style= =3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">guys and I think they'= re still looking at the options.</span><span style=3D"font-family:arial,san= s-serif;font-size:13px">=A0</span>=A0</div> <div><br></div><div>Max</div></div><br></div></div> --089e0122e6e6daac6a04e65a642c-- --===============2265784337753240856== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography --===============2265784337753240856==--
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