[147174] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (ianG)
Tue Sep 17 10:49:11 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 12:49:46 +0300
From: ianG <iang@iang.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAHOTMVKzknTbsQ4WuFgVN7kBEpnsh0dKoDjHtKUfUOrcxnM3EA@mail.gmail.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 17/09/13 01:40 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 9:44 AM, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com
> <mailto:frantz@pwpconsult.com>> wrote:
>
> After Rijndael was selected as AES, someone suggested the really
> paranoid should super encrypt with all 5 finalests in the
> competition. Five level super encryption is probably overkill, but
> two or three levels can offer some real advantages.
>
>
> I wish there was a term for this sort of design in encryption systems
> beyond just "defense in depth". AFAICT there is not such a term.
>
> How about the Failsafe Principle? ;)
A good question. In my work, I've generally modelled it such that the
entire system still works if one algorithm fails totally. But I don't
have a name for that approach.
iang
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