[147177] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jerry Leichter)
Tue Sep 17 11:43:38 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
In-Reply-To: <523825BA.9060107@iang.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 11:01:46 -0400
To: ianG <iang@iang.org>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Sep 17, 2013, at 5:49 AM, ianG <iang@iang.org> wrote:
>>
>> I wish there was a term for this sort of design in encryption systems
>> beyond just "defense in depth". AFAICT there is not such a term.
>>
>> How about the Failsafe Principle? ;)
>
> A good question. In my work, I've generally modelled it such that the entire system still works if one algorithm fails totally. But I don't have a name for that approach.
How about the X Property (Trust No One - with a different slant on "One")?
-- Jerry :-)
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