[147218] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Viktor Dukhovni)
Wed Sep 18 13:22:34 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 14:30:06 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography@dukhovni.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <015801ceb43b$1d3dc2a0$57b947e0$@huitema.net>
Reply-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:48:40PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > Given that many real organizations have hundreds of front end
> > machines sharing RSA private keys, theft of RSA keys may very well be
> > much easier in many cases than broader forms of sabotage.
>
> Or we could make it easy to have one separate RSA key per front end, signed
> using the main RSA key of the organization.
This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
For HTTPS, there is little indication yet that any of the major
browsers are likely to implement DANE support in the near future.
--
Viktor.
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