[147233] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Carl Wallace)
Thu Sep 19 13:00:58 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 22:28:52 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20130918215031.GZ29796@mournblade.imrryr.org>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 9/18/13 5:50 PM, "Viktor Dukhovni" <cryptography@dukhovni.org> wrote:
>On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:47:17PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>> > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
>> > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
>> > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
>> > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
>> >
>> > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
>>
>> X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
>> don't work.
>
>And public CAs don't generally sell intermediate CAs with name
>constraints. Rather undercuts their business model.
The inability to constrain trust anchors doesn't help matters much either.
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