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Re: [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dirk-Willem van Gulik)
Tue Sep 24 09:43:39 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwjSDcJ73wJ9vqR6DR+-BqJrEyW6SK2TrT4Bt17EY1D9Cg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 10:09:28 +0200
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com


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Op 20 sep. 2013, om 14:55 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> =
het volgende geschreven:

> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 4:36 AM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik =
<dirkx@webweaving.org> wrote:
>=20
> Op 19 sep. 2013, om 19:15 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker =
<hallam@gmail.com> het volgende geschreven:
>=20
> > Let us say I want to send an email to alice@example.com securely.
> ...
> > =
ppid:alice@example.com:example.net:Syd6BMXje5DLqHhYSpQswhPcvDXj+8rK9LaonAf=
cNWM
> =85
...
>         <id>.<ns>.<namespace>.fqdn-in-some-tld.
>=20
> which is in fact a first-come, first-served secure dynamic dns =
updatable zone containing the public key.
>=20
> Which once created allows only updating to those (still) having the =
private key of the public key that signed the initial claim of that =
<id>.
>=20
> Interesting, though I suspect this is attempting to meet different =
trust requirements than I am.

Most likely. The aim was not so much to secure an entry - but to provide =
a sufficiently solid bread-crum trail to the information which could be =
used to do so; to be able to use both 'trust on first contact' -or- a =
trust chain; and to provide 'low cost' yet very robust pillars that can =
be managed by 'untrusted' parties.=20

Or in other words - the design focused more on a workable trust =
infrastructure with the governance pushed as close to the (end) user as =
possible; at the expense of some 'absolute default' trust (absolute  as =
in the sort of trust you'd get by default from 'some =
deity/governement/big-mega-crop says I am good/interacting with a legal =
entity).

Dw.


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>Op 20 sep. 2013, om 14:55 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; het =
volgende geschreven:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 4:36 AM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dirkx@webweaving.org" =
target=3D"_blank">dirkx@webweaving.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; =
border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); =
border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: =
auto; "><br>
Op 19 sep. 2013, om 19:15 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; het volgende =
geschreven:<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; Let us say I want to send an email to <a =
href=3D"mailto:alice@example.com">alice@example.com</a> securely.<br>
</div>...<br>
&gt; =
ppid:alice@example.com:example.net:Syd6BMXje5DLqHhYSpQswhPcvDXj+8rK9LaonAf=
cNWM<br>
=85</blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote>...<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: =
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, =
204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: =
static; z-index: auto; ">
<div class=3D"im">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&lt;id&gt;.&lt;ns&gt;.&lt;namespace&gt;.fqdn-in-some-tld.</div>
<br>
which is in fact a first-come, first-served secure dynamic dns updatable =
zone containing the public key.<br>
<br>
Which once created allows only updating to those (still) having the =
private key of the public key that signed the initial claim of that =
&lt;id&gt;.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Interesting, though I =
suspect this is attempting to meet different trust requirements than I =
am.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Most likely. =
The aim was not so much to secure an entry - but to provide a =
sufficiently solid bread-crum trail to the information which could be =
used to do so; to be able to use both 'trust on first contact' -or- a =
trust chain; and to provide 'low cost' yet very robust pillars that can =
be managed by 'untrusted' parties.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Or in =
other words - the design focused more on a workable trust infrastructure =
with the governance pushed as close to the (end) user as possible; at =
the expense of some 'absolute default' trust (absolute &nbsp;as in the =
sort of trust you'd get by default from 'some =
deity/governement/big-mega-crop says I am good/interacting with a legal =
entity).</div><div><br></div><div>Dw.</div></div><div><br></div></body></h=
tml>=

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