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X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com In-Reply-To: <7607ECFD-A532-4D34-9018-9438DB34997E@goldmark.org> From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 13:10:32 -0700 To: Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey@goldmark.org> Cc: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk@gmail.com>, cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, Crypto List <cryptography@randombit.net> Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com --===============6962056910016419409== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=bcaec547ca15ac669004e7b38c6b --bcaec547ca15ac669004e7b38c6b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey@goldmark.org>wro= te: > If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering their > tracks in such a way, why wouldn=92t they have pulled the same trick with > Dual_EC_DRBG? > <tinfoilhat>They wanted us to think they were incompetent, so we would expect that Dual_EC_DRBG was their failed attempt to tamper with a cryptographic standard, and so we would overlook the more sinister and subtle attempts to tamper with the NIST curves</tinfoilhat> --=20 Tony Arcieri --bcaec547ca15ac669004e7b38c6b Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <span di= r=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:jeffrey@goldmark.org" target=3D"_blank">jef= frey@goldmark.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div = class=3D"gmail_quote"> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p= x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im"><span style=3D"color:rgb(3= 4,34,34)">If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering = their tracks in such a way, why wouldn=92t they have pulled the same trick = with Dual_EC_DRBG?</span></div> </blockquote><div><br></div><div><tinfoilhat>They wanted us to think = they were incompetent, so we would expect that Dual_EC_DRBG was their faile= d attempt to tamper with a cryptographic standard, and so we would overlook= the more sinister and subtle attempts to tamper with the NIST curves</t= infoilhat>=A0</div> </div><div><br></div>-- <br>Tony Arcieri<br> </div></div> --bcaec547ca15ac669004e7b38c6b-- --===============6962056910016419409== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography --===============6962056910016419409==--
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