[147447] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: [Cryptography] TLS2

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Wed Oct 2 10:25:51 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2013 16:13:00 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
CC: Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAHOTMVL2f6Tx8gK_LG7QGL+C7WY9wWG2Svd2g0yk8ALqMr3Lyw@mail.gmail.com>
Reply-To: jamesd@echeque.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

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On 2013-10-02 13:18, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> LANGSEC calls this: full recognition before processing
>
> http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/langsec/occupy/ 
> <http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/%7Esergey/langsec/occupy/>

I disagree slightly with langsec.

At compile time you want an extremely powerful language for describing 
data, that can describe any possible data structure.

At run time, you want the least possible power, such that your 
recognizer can only recognize the specified and expected data structure.

Thus BER and DER are bad for the reasons given by Langsec, indeed they 
illustrate the evils that langsec condemns, but these criticisms do not 
normally apply to PER, since for PER, the dangerously great power exists 
only at compile time, and you would have to work pretty hard to retain 
any substantial part of that dangerously great power at run time.

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2013-10-02 13:18, Tony Arcieri
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAHOTMVL2f6Tx8gK_LG7QGL+C7WY9wWG2Svd2g0yk8ALqMr3Lyw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Context-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
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        <div class="gmail_extra">
          <div class="gmail_quote">LANGSEC calls this: full recognition
            before processing
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/%7Esergey/langsec/occupy/"
                target="_blank">http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/langsec/occupy/</a><br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I disagree slightly with langsec.<br>
    <br>
    At compile time you want an extremely powerful language for
    describing data, that can describe any possible data structure.<br>
    <br>
    At run time, you want the least possible power, such that your
    recognizer can only recognize the specified and expected data
    structure.<br>
    <br>
    Thus BER and DER are bad for the reasons given by Langsec, indeed
    they illustrate the evils that langsec condemns, but these
    criticisms do not normally apply to PER, since for PER, the
    dangerously great power exists only at compile time, and you would
    have to work pretty hard to retain any substantial part of that
    dangerously great power at run time.<br>
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