[147513] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Sha3
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (james hughes)
Sat Oct 5 10:45:12 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: james hughes <hughejp@mac.com>
In-reply-to: <524E43C3.9000506@deadhat.com>
Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2013 23:40:59 -0700
To: David Johnston <dj@deadhat.com>
Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com List" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,
James Hughes <hughejp@mac.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Oct 3, 2013, at 9:27 PM, David Johnston <dj@deadhat.com> wrote:
> On 10/1/2013 2:34 AM, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>> What I don't understand here is why the process of selecting a standard =
algorithm for cryptographic primitives is so highly focused on speed. ~
> =
> What makes you think Keccak is faster than the alternatives that were not=
selected? My implementations suggest otherwise.
> I thought the main motivation for selecting Keccak was "Sponge good".
I agree: Sponge Good, Merkle=96Damg=E5rd Bad. Simple enough. =
I believe this thread is not about the choice of Keccak for SHA3, it is abo=
ut NIST's changes of Keccak for SHA3. =
[Instead of pontificating at length based on conjecture and conspiracy theo=
ries and smearing reputations based on nothing other than hot air] Someone =
on this list must know the authors of Keccak. Why not ask them. They are th=
e ones that know the most about the algorithm, why the parameters are what =
they are and what the changes mean for their vision. =
Here is my question for them: "Given the light of the current situation, wh=
at is your current opinion of NIST's changes of Keccak as you specified it =
to SHA-3 as NIST standardized it?" =
If the Keccak authors are OK with the changes, who are we to argue about th=
ese chances? =
If the Keccak authors don't like the changes, given the situation NIST is i=
n, I bet NIST will have no recourse but to re-open the SHA3 discussion.
Jim
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