[147660] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicolas Rachinsky)
Mon Oct 14 15:13:30 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:08:52 +0200
From: Nicolas Rachinsky <crypto-2@ml.turing-complete.org>
To: John Denker <jsd@av8n.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Nicolas Rachinsky <crypto-2@ml.turing-complete.org>,
John Denker <jsd@av8n.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52574293.80905@av8n.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
* John Denker <jsd@av8n.com> [2013-10-10 17:13 -0700]:
> *) Each server should publish a public key for "/dev/null" so that
> users can send cover traffic upstream to the server, without
> worrying that it might waste downstream bandwidth.
>
> This is crucial for deniabililty: If the rubber-hose guy accuses
> me of replying to ABC during the XYZ crisis, I can just shrug and
> say it was cover traffic.
If the server deletes cover traffic, the nsa just needs to subscribe.
Then the messages which you sent but which were not delivered via the
list are cover traffic.
Nicolas
--
http://www.rachinsky.de/nicolas
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