[147711] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (dj@deadhat.com)
Thu Oct 17 17:12:21 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <526018F0.9040802@borg.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 20:56:31 -0000
From: dj@deadhat.com
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
> On 10/17/2013 08:32 AM, Adam Back wrote:
>
> Should RNGs attempt to detect uninitialized states and refuse to run?
>
>
Yes. So they don't release low entropy numbers.
But hardware should provide a firehose throughput entropy source from
power on so the RNG is always initialized to full entropy and won't block
regardless of the load on the random number service.
_______________________________________________
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@metzdowd.com
http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
