[147759] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Sun Oct 20 12:18:33 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52571A15.2060606@sonic.net>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2013 14:59:06 +0100
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
To: Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net>
Cc: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 10 October 2013 22:20, Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> wrote:
> On 10/10/2013 12:54 PM, John Kelsey wrote:
>> Having a public bulletin board of posted emails, plus a protocol
>> for anonymously finding the ones your key can decrypt, seems
>> like a pretty decent architecture for prism-proof email. The
>> tricky bit of crypto is in making access to the bulletin board
>> both efficient and private.
>
> Wrong on both counts, I think. If you make access private, you
> generate metadata because nobody can get at mail other than their
> own. If you make access efficient, you generate metadata because
> you're avoiding the "wasted" bandwidth that would otherwise prevent
> the generation of metadata. Encryption is sufficient privacy, and
> efficiency actively works against the purpose of privacy.
>
> The only bow I'd make to efficiency is to split the message stream
> into channels when it gets to be more than, say, 2GB per day. At
> that point you would need to know both what channel your recipient
> listens to *and* the appropriate encryption key before you could
> send mail.
Precisely.
Didn't there used to be a newsgroup for exactly this purpose? I can't
find it now, but I distinctly remember it.
I'd guess NNTP was a better protocol than SMTP for this.
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