[147989] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] DNSSEC = completely unnecessary?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nico Williams)
Mon Nov 4 12:29:41 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2013 10:52:51 -0600
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Greg <greg@kinostudios.com>
In-Reply-To: <18B88BE7-7E0B-4F6C-A2F6-9AF7E9637306@kinostudios.com>
Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com List" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On Sun, Nov 03, 2013 at 11:33:37PM -0500, Greg wrote:
> In all my readings on it I kept walking away thinking that I
> understood its purpose, but I'd then come back at myself with the same
> question: what does it give us over HTTPS?
Answer: Something closer to a real PKI with one root and much less
complexity than PKIX. And if you also use the TLS server PKI then you
get two factors for authenticating servers to users.
> Selected quotes:
>
> Unfortunately, DNSSEC isn't actually providing additional security
> against a genuine MITM attack: SSL/TLS is still the weak link in the
> chain when DNSSEC is used!
Not so; see DANE [RFC6698].
> What say you list? To me, the DNSSEC thing seems like it might be
> mostly a waste of a bunch of people's time.
DNSSEC has issues (e.g., slow deployment, bandwidth-amplification), but
it is not a waste of time, and together with DANE, DNSSEC provides
robust security (or can, assuming other things are done right, like
selection of public key algorithms and key sizes).
Nico
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