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Re: [Cryptography] NIST should publish Suite A

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Stewart)
Wed Nov 13 02:01:16 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 18:56:58 -0800
To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
From: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com>
In-Reply-To: <6F7F1FBD-EBC5-4D3A-A40E-D06EB16F2439@lrw.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

At 03:28 AM 11/12/2013, Jerry Leichter wrote:
>The NSA would have no reason to be concerned about Suite A being 
>attackable *by NSA*.

Huh?  Of course they would.
Half* the NSA's job is to crack communications, half of it's to protect them.
The people whose job is to protect codes have a responsibility to 
their customers
to make sure that the code-crackers can't crack them,
not only because the customers might insist on it,
but because good operational security includes considering threat models like
"somebody in the NSA is a mole" or "somebody hired contractors as sysadmins",
and following appropriate least-privilege policies, two-person rules, etc.

Perhaps the crackers' business model also includes having some "Suite 
A-Prime" gear
for people they want to attack while telling them it's Suite A gear,
but that's not really the same case at "no reason to be concerned."


(*Ok, sometimes "half" == 99%.)

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